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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM

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**Countering the Terrorist Threat:
The 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry**

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Adding Value to the Total Force and to the Nation

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FOREWORD

This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

Much media attention was given to the activation, training and **non-deployment** of Army National Guard combat maneuver brigades judged insufficiently ready to deploy and perform their missions. This report, in contrast, tells the story of the activation, training, **deployment and successful employment** of an Army Reserve maneuver battalion. It is the story of the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, United States Army Reserve, performing a counter-terrorism mission in Germany in support of Operation Desert Storm. The battalion was trained to augment the security and defense of the Panama Canal if ever necessary, but was sufficiently flexible to perform a similar mission as part of V Corps near Frankfurt. In this manner, the continuing security of key facilities, American military personnel and their dependents in Germany was ensured when V Corps troops were deployed to the war theater.

Other monographs will be issued to describe the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They will include military police, civil affairs specialists, engineers, trainers, communicators, medical personnel, transporters and strategic intelligence units. These monographs, and the results of additional research on contributions of the Army Reserve to operations in the Persian Gulf, will be bound eventually in a single volume.

Your comments on this and future issuances are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

RONALD E. SMITH
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Program Analysis and
Evaluation Division

**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**Countering the Terrorist Threat:
The 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry**

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John R. Brinkerhoff, Consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, has been the principal author of this report. Ted Silva and John Seitz were editors and contributing authors.

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**Countering the Terrorist Threat:
The 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry**

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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM

Countering the Terrorist Threat:
The 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry

Arriving at Frankfurt

On 6 February 1991, the first of two Boeing 747s carrying the 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, United States Army Reserve, landed at Frankfurt Airport at 1645 hours. The second 747 arrived later that day at 2130 hours. After 20 tumultuous days of mobilization processing, training, and validation, at Fort Carson, Colorado, the 739 members of the battalion were in Germany. They moved into their new quarters at Ray Barracks in Friedberg to assume their mission of providing physical security for the facilities and housing areas of the V Corps in the Frankfurt Area. Many of the Active Army troops of V Corps had deployed in the Fall of 1990 to the Southwest Asia theater as part of VII Corps. The Chief of Staff of V Corps, Brigadier General James R. Harding saw a need for troops to guard empty barracks and vulnerable housing areas against possible terrorist attacks and requested help. The unit selected to provide the necessary security was the 3/87th--an Army Reserve infantry battalion with a CAPSTONE mission of augmenting U.S. Army forces stationed in Panama to secure the Panama Canal. Although many of the infantrymen were disappointed about not getting into the fight in the Desert, they considered themselves professionals and were determined to do a good job in Europe.

Twelve weeks later, the 3/87th re-embarked on two 747s and returned to their home station, Colorado Springs, Colorado, with the satisfaction of a job well done. But, there was some lingering distaste for the way they had been treated--both while processing at Fort Carson and while providing security for the Frankfurt Area in Germany. The story of the 3/87th Infantry reveals much about how an Army--or any other organization--is affected by personalities as well as policies and procedures. It shows the tremendous cultural gap that divides the Active Component from the Reserve Components within the same Total Army. Finally, it shows how an Army Reserve infantry battalion that was not as good as it thought, became a good unit. The process to get there was not always smooth or pleasant, but was, effective in the end.

Origin of the Mission

The Frankfurt security mission of the 3/87th Infantry originated in three major events: the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein; the decision by President Bush to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait by force if need be; and a rising terrorist threat against U.S. Army personnel and installations in Germany. The first of these events brought about a major deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia. Their mission was to deter Saddam Hussein from moving Southward into Saudi Arabia, and to defend that nation if deterrence failed. The initial Army deployments consisted of the XVIII Airborne Corps and support units from the Continental United States (CONUS). Once the decision was made to achieve a capability for offensive action in the theater, additional Army forces were deployed from CONUS and also from Europe.

The Deployment of VII Corps from Europe

On 8 November 1990, President Bush announced that additional forces would be sent to the Southwest Asia theater to provide a basis for waging offensive war if that became necessary.¹ As a result, major elements of U.S. Army Europe moved from Germany to the theater under VII Corps Headquarters. Europe-based units that moved with VII Corps included the following: 1st Armored Division; 3rd Armored Division (from V Corps); 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division (Tiger Brigade); 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment; two field artillery brigades with six battalions; the 7th Engineer Brigade with four battalions and two companies; the 93rd Signal Brigade with four area battalions; the 14th Military Police Brigade with two battalions; the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade; the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade with two attack helicopter battalions; several air defense battalions; and numerous composite support units in the Corps Support Command. About 87,000 troops were moved from Europe, including almost 9,000 individual augmentees and crews.² To help compensate for the absence of these troops in Europe, additional military personnel--all Reservists--were sent from the United States.

The Reinforcement of Europe

The fact that the Army sent 9,088 Reserve Component soldiers to reinforce Europe was almost unnoticed in the process of activating members of the National Guard and Army Reserve, and deploying a quarter-million Army troops to the Persian Gulf. The departure of VII Corps from Germany for the Southwest Asia Theater left behind families, facilities, and jobs still to be done. The Army deployed 16 Army National Guard units, with 3,508 personnel, and 27 Army Reserve Units, with 5,580 personnel to various locations in Europe. The units involved in the reinforcement of Europe are shown in Figure 1 by branch and component.

Figure 1.

Units Deployed to Europe for DESERT STORM

Branch	National Guard	Army Reserve	Total
Engineer	2	0	2
Infantry	0	1	1
Military Intelligence	0	1	1
Military Police	4	6	10
Civil Affairs	0	1	1
Composite Support	2	0	2
Medical	5	13	18
Ordnance	1	3	4
Public Affairs	1	1	2
Transportation	1	1	2
Total	16	27	43

Some of these units had operational missions. Medical units were used not only to provide dependent care and other continuing health care missions in Europe, but also to establish a base to treat casualties evacuated from the Southwest Asia theater. Five general and station hospitals with an aggregate capacity of 4,000 beds were deployed to augment the capacity of existing military hospitals in Europe. The 1186th Transportation Terminal Unit operated the port at Rotterdam to help move VII Corps equipment from Germany to South-west Asia.³ Detachment 1 of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command helped coordinate host nation support for the forces in Southwest Asia, and other Civil Affairs elements participated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey and Northern Iraq. The other units that were involved in providing support and security for U.S. Army Europe, included two National Guard engineer battalions, ten military police companies, and the 3/87th Infantry Battalion (USAR).

The V Corps Security Problem

Many of the troops that deployed to the Southwest Asia Theater were from V Corps and were stationed in the Frankfurt area. These included the entire 3rd Armored Division, an

engineer battalion; a signal battalion; an MP battalion; and other, smaller units. Altogether several thousand military personnel left the Frankfurt area. This left V Corps with a problem in securing its facilities.

V Corps was particularly sensitive to this mission because of the high level of terrorist threat against U.S. military personnel and facilities in that area. The threat of terrorist activity had always been present in Frankfurt, due perhaps to the large numbers of foreign workers who clustered in that area. There had been some previous attacks on U.S. soldiers in bars and on senior officers, including General Alexander M. Haig and General Frederick Kroesen. There continued to be numerous reports of threats against Americans.

Now, with the United States and other nations involved in military operations against a radical Arab state, the intelligence reports indicated a high probability of terrorist attacks. Action by Iraqi sponsored terrorist groups, the PLO, or other groups within the international terrorist network were thought to be quite likely. It was believed that, if it could be done without much risk, the terrorists would seek to inflict heavy damage on U.S. forces, and the wives and children of troops fighting in the Persian Gulf.⁴

Before the deployment to the Persian Gulf, V Corps had relied on the units to secure their own barracks. They did this by providing guard details in accordance with standard Army operating procedures. When the troops left for the Southwest Asia Theater, their barracks were left unprotected, as the small rear detachments were insufficient to provide adequate security. An additional complication during DESERT STORM was the vulnerability of spouses and children living in military housing areas. Under successive programs to improve German-American relations and make the American military presence less intrusive, these housing areas had been integrated purposefully into German neighborhoods. Fences were taken down, and access was unrestricted into these areas. Now, V Corps needed a way to secure the Frankfurt area.

V Corps Actions

Brigadier General James R. Harding, the V Corps Chief of Staff, was acutely aware of the security problem as V Corps was responsible for the security of the Frankfurt area. When planning for a possible movement of troops from Germany to Southwest Asia started in September 1990, the need to "beef up" security for the Frankfurt area became a matter of concern. The Frankfurt area was comprised of ten communities, consisting of 40-50 sub-communities and a large number of small facilities.

General Harding sought to obtain additional forces to augment the security of V Corps after the deployment of forces to Southwest Asia. After some consideration, it was decided to

request an infantry battalion to do the mission. Military Police (MP) units were in short supply because large numbers of MP companies were deploying to the Southwest Asia theater to perform the law and order mission, which only they could do. V Corps units not deploying to Southwest Asia were either assisting the movement of the deploying units or training for possible deployment to Southwest Asia if the war was prolonged. In September 1990, General Harding forwarded a request to United States Army Europe for an infantry battalion for the force protection mission.⁵

Before DESERT STORM, each unit in V Corps was tasked to provide security for its own facilities, and security was not a primary mission of the Military Police. Colonel Lucious E. (Ed) Delk commanded the 18th Military Police Brigade which contained the Military Police units of V Corps. These included two MP Battalions with a total of eight MP companies. The MP units had been working on a four phase duty cycle rotating through field support for tactical units, training, law enforcement in the Frankfurt area, and maintenance of equipment. Typically, a company would have a platoon in each phase. The law enforcement mission was a high priority for V Corps and Colonel Delk. When one of Colonel Delk's two battalions, the 93rd MP Battalion, went to Southwest Asia with four companies, there were insufficient remaining MP assets in V Corps to do all the required missions. It was necessary to obtain additional MP units simply to perform the MP law enforcement mission.⁶

V Corps requested and received two additional MP companies: the 323rd MP Company, ARNG, Toledo, Ohio; and the 340th MP Company, USAR, Jamaica, New York. These were both tactical support companies whose peacetime training emphasized support of operations in the field and did not cover the law enforcement mission. Both of these units deployed without their organic tactical vehicles and radios and were equipped with civilian vehicles from V Corps stocks. These units were retrained for the law enforcement mission and used exclusively in this role. For example, one platoon was stationed at the Baumholder Training Area to replace an Active Component MP company that had deployed to Southwest Asia.⁷

Pending the arrival of the requested infantry battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, of the 8th Infantry Division moved from Baumholder Training Area to Frankfurt and established physical security for the area. The 3/12th assumed the mission to provide physical security for Frankfurt in November 1990.

Prior to their arrival, the request for an additional infantry battalion to perform a security mission in Europe was approved by U.S. Army Europe and forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the Army. A light infantry battalion was desired because it would not have much equipment to be moved. The National Guard wanted the mission, and there was some sentiment for deploying an Active Army battalion. However, the Office, Chief Army Reserve pressed for using an Army Reserve combat unit, and prevailed. The 3/87th Infantry had a good reputation and looked good on paper. It met all the criteria and was best in terms of reported personnel readiness and availability--an important measure because there were too few fillers to meet all

demands for them. So the final decision was to use the 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army Reserve, to fill the V Corps request.⁸

The 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry

The 3/87th Infantry is one of two separate infantry battalions in the U.S. Army Reserve. Although most of the Army's Reserve Component combat units are in the National Guard, the Army Reserve has three infantry brigades, a separate tank battalion, two special forces groups (airborne), 12 field artillery battalions, and three field artillery brigade headquarters.⁹ The other separate infantry battalion in the Army Reserve is the 100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry, which is located in Honolulu, Hawaii. This battalion is the lineal descendant of two highly decorated battalions of Japanese-Americans that won renown for operations in Italy during World War II--the 100th Separate Infantry Battalion, and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.¹⁰

The 3rd Battalion of the 87th Infantry Regiment also has a distinguished lineage tracing to the 10th Mountain Division which was formed in 1941 for World War II. As part of the division, troops of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment fought in the Aleutian Islands and Italy using their special skills as Mountain Warriors. Units of the 87th Infantry Regiment also served in Germany and fought in Vietnam. Upon reverting to Army Reserve status in 1975, the 3rd Battalion established a presence in Colorado Springs, Colorado, close to Camp Hale, Colorado, the original location of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment.

In 1987, the 3/87th was assigned a CAPSTONE mission to augment the 193rd Light Infantry Brigade in the Panama Canal Zone in time of need. Upon mobilization, the 3/87th would deploy to Panama and provide physical security for the Panama Canal against guerrillas and sabotage. To prepare for this mission, the battalion trained during 1987 at the Jungle Operations Training Center in Panama, sent personnel to Guatemala in 1988, and exercised as a battalion in Southern Florida in 1989.

In the Spring of 1990, the battalion was evaluated by a team from the Active Component 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment of the 193rd Brigade and was proclaimed to be "a truly competent sister battalion."¹¹

On the eve of DESERT STORM, the 3/87th was eager to go to war and the members of the battalion considered themselves to be well trained and ready to deploy to fulfill their Panama mission--or any other infantry mission.

Organization

In August 1990, the 3/87th was organized under TOE 7-15H as an infantry battalion with a headquarters and headquarters company, a combat support company, and three rifle companies. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the Combat Support Company were located at Fort Carson, Colorado Springs; Company A in Pueblo; and both Company B and Company C, in Denver, Colorado. The battalion was equipped with 32 M-60 machine guns, 11 .50 caliber machine guns, six 60mm mortars, four 81mm mortars, 18 TOW anti-tank missile launchers, and 31 Dragon anti-tank missile launchers. It had 83 vehicles, primarily HMMVVs.¹² In September 1990, the battalion was reorganized as a light infantry battalion under TOE 7-15L, but implementation of this reorganization did not take place until after the battalion returned from Germany and was demobilized. This delay did not affect the operations of the battalion, for the major changes involved reducing the number of vehicles (to 39) and crew-served weapons, and these items were not taken along when the unit went to Germany.

Key Personnel

Information on the key personnel of the 3/87th as of January 1991 is contained in Figure 2. The table shows key personnel, the date of assignment to the position held during the mobilization, and the number of years of active duty served in the Active Component before joining the Army Reserve.

The battalion staff and company commanders of the 3/87th were an experienced group with substantial service on active duty and in the Army Reserve. Overall, these key personnel had an average of just over three years of active duty. Captains Bair and Mesarch were AGR officers with an additional six and nine years in their AGR active duty status. Four of the officers--Roux, Freund, Klein, and Scott are graduates of the United States Military Academy.

Figure 2.

Key Personnel of the 3/87th Infantry in January 1991

Position	Incumbent	Date Assigned	Years Active Duty
Battalion Commander	LTC Dean F. O'Neil	Jun 89	3
Executive Officer	MAJ Russell P. Roux	Mar 90	5
Command Sergeant Major	1SG Melvin L. Snyder	Jan 91	3
Personnel Officer (S-1)	CPT Wayne P. Blair	Jun 89	3
Intelligence Officer (S-2)	CPT Richard F. Klein	Apr 89	5
Assistant Intelligence Officer	1LT John Sterling	Jun 88	0
Operations Officer (S-3)	MAJ Edward A. Freund	Dec 90	5
Assistant Operations Officer	CPT Robert W. Scott	Nov 90	5
Assistant Operations Officer	CPT Michael V. Mesarch	Jun 89	3
Assistant Operations Officer	1LT Herman J. Ledbetter	Mar 86	4
Supply Officer (S-4)	CPT John G. Clark	Dec 90	3
Chaplain	MAJ Richard T. Leever	Jan 91	9
Commander, HQ&HQ Co	CPT Gregory Peck	Aug 86	0
Commander, A Co	CPT Michael O. Prinsen	Oct 86	3
Commander, B Co	CPT Alan C. Jones	May 84	4
Commander, C Co	CPT Frank Lee	Oct 89	5
Commander, Cbt Spt Co	CPT Patrick J. Slowey	Dec 87	3

The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Dean F. O'Neil had extensive active duty infantry experience as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam, and as a rifle company commander. He is a graduate of the basic and advanced officers courses at the Infantry School. His USAR service was with special forces units and the 1st Maneuver Training Command. He is qualified in airborne, jumpmaster, ranger, special forces, and air assault.¹³ LTC O'Neil had

already been selected for promotion to colonel prior to the call up and was awaiting a vacancy to assume his higher rank.

The battalion executive officer, Major (MAJ) Russell P. Roux, had considerable active duty service as an infantryman. His service included combat in Vietnam as a rifle platoon leader, and command of a rifle company in Korea. He is a qualified parachutist and ranger, and is a graduate of the advanced officers course at the Infantry School and the resident course at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College. After joining the Army Reserve in 1981, Major Roux commanded Company B, 3/87th and then joined the 1st Maneuver Training Command as a training management officer.¹⁴ He was employed by LTC O'Neil to oversee the personnel and logistics areas within the battalion.¹⁵

While experienced as individuals, the battalion staff officers were relatively inexperienced in their jobs. Most of them, including the Battalion Commander, had been on the job just over a year prior to the mobilization. The Battalion Executive Officer had been on the job for eight months. Only the two lieutenants on the staff had been in their positions for more than a year. Three key personnel--the Operations Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, and Supply Officer--were brand new and had joined the battalion after it was mobilized. The critical battalion operations officer job had been vacant for a year when it was finally filled.¹⁶

The Company Commanders, on the other hand, had considerable stability in their positions. Three had held their commands for four or more years, one for three years, and one for just over a year.

The command group experienced some turbulence caused by the non-deployment of the Battalion Sergeant Major, SGM Mabry. SGM Mabry was not allowed to mobilize with the battalion. He was an Engineer company First Sergeant who had been placed in the key position of Battalion Sergeant Major by the 96th ARCOM. Upon receiving the alert, Major Roux recommended to the Battalion Commander that an infantry sergeant major be obtained for the forthcoming deployment. SGM Mabry was willing to be transferred, and the 96th ARCOM reassigned him to another CSM position.¹⁷

First Sergeant (1SG) Melvin L. Snyder of Combat Support Company was appointed Acting Command Sergeant Major of the 3/87th for the operation.¹⁸ First Sergeant Snyder had a large family, including a foster child who was severely handicapped and expected to die in a short time. This situation caused him to take emergency leave and return to Colorado during the time that the battalion was in Germany.¹⁹ Despite the strain that his personal situation must have caused, 1SG Snyder is credited with doing a good job.²⁰

The Chaplain, Major Richard T. Leever, was assigned to the battalion upon mobilization as one of the fillers, reassigned from the 44th Medical Clearing Company, USAR, Grand Forks, North Dakota. Chaplain Leever was an enlisted Marine for two years and, after completing his

theological studies and becoming an ordained minister, served on active duty, including three years with the 82nd Airborne Division²¹, as an Army Chaplain.

Personnel Strength

The changes in strength of the 3/87th as it was mobilized are shown in Figure 3.²² Pre-mobilization readiness reports that showed an assigned strength almost equal to authorized strength were a major factor in the selection of the battalion for the mission. However, these reports were somewhat misleading. The battalion actually reported for duty almost two hundred personnel short of its authorized strength. Of the shortage, 87 were no longer members of the Selected Reserve, 83 had not received initial active duty training, four were members of the ROTC, six were medically disqualified, and others were not qualified for deployment.

This left the battalion in need of additional personnel to bring it up to strength prior to being deployed. The 96th ARCOM arranged for 36 personnel to be assigned from other Reserve units, additional fillers were obtained from Sixth Army and FORSCOM, and ARPERCEN sent 114 IRR enlisted personnel as fillers. 97 of these fillers deployed with the unit.²³ After receiving the fillers and undergoing additional screening at Fort Carson, the battalion deployed to Germany with a total of 739 personnel. The personnel strength changes of the battalion were typical of many Guard and Reserve units mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM.²⁴

Figure 3.

Strength Dynamics of 3/87th During Mobilization

	Officers	Enlisted	Total
Pre-Mobilization Authorized Strength	44	751	795
Pre-Mobilization Assigned Strength	42	738	780
Mobilized at Fort Carson	39	555	594
TPU Personnel Assigned	3	46	49
IRR Personnel Assigned	0	114	114
Total Mobilized Strength	42	715	757
Deployed Strength	41	698	739

The IRR fillers presented some problems. Many of them had volunteered to be called up to fight as infantrymen and were disappointed even more than the original unit members when that turned out not to be the case. Some of the IRRs turned out to be unqualified. The Chaplain, among others, observed that many of the IRR soldiers were unfit for duty because of overweight and other problems.²⁵ Most of the IRR fillers, however, adapted to their circumstances well. Combat Support Company received 28 IRR fillers and integrated them quickly into the unit, and HHC had no real problems.²⁶ Later, when the battalion was in Germany, there were problems because the IRR personnel were administered differently. For example, initially they were not allowed to be promoted. During de-mobilization the IRR personnel again were treated separately from the personnel of the battalion. Overall, however, the IRR fillers proved to be good soldiers and brought needed additional strength to the battalion.

Pre-Mobilization Preparation

The 96th ARCOM was (and is) the parent headquarters of the 3/87th, responsible for peacetime training and support of the unit. The 96th ARCOM was active in the pre-mobilization phase but relinquished a direct role in the mobilization processing of the 3/87th after the battalion was activated. One of the ways in which the 96th ARCOM helped the battalion was to locate and reassign qualified volunteers from other units to 3/87th to fill vacancies in specific skills after the unit was alerted. The 96th ARCOM became active again during the demobilization process and sent LTC Bert T. Robison to Fort Carson to monitor that process.

Annual Training for 1990 was conducted at Fort Carson from 5 through 17 August 1990. Four hundred fifty-six members of the battalion participated in the training, while another 116 members were at initial entry training or performed alternate annual training. Training emphasis was on squad level training and evaluation, mortar operations, processing for overseas movement, and field training for the relatively new battalion staff. Most of the ratings of the battalion's performance were "P," indicating that the unit needed practice. There were no "T" ratings for fully trained. Unsatisfactory ratings were assigned for operations in an NBC environment--because the necessary equipment was not available--and for two tactical tasks: performing an air assault and performing a relief in place. Overall, while there was improvement from previous evaluations and the annual training was judged to be "very successful," the battalion was barely proficient at the squad level. The plan was to train up to the platoon level for annual training in 1991, but this sequence was interrupted by the mobilization of the battalion.²⁷

A few days after the completion of annual training, the President authorized the mobilization of Reserve units for Operation DESERT SHIELD, and the members of the battalion began to consider that they might be called up. The battalion took additional steps to increase its readiness. All personnel qualified with their individual weapons--pistols, M16 rifles, and

M60 machine guns--on the range during November 1990.²⁸ In early December, the 96th ARCOM sent a 30 person team to Fort Carson to conduct a "mini-POM" check of the unit's preparedness for overseas movement, and the battalion did very well.²⁹

There was some advance warning for the unit. LTC O'Neil was notified by the 96th ARCOM on 7 January 1991--ten days prior to the actual event--that a call up was possible.³⁰ The commander and his staff started planning quietly for the next stage. The rest of the members of the 3/87th were notified on 14 and 15 January 1991 that the battalion was going to be activated. The infantrymen of the 3/87th were ready, and many hoped they would be sent directly to Saudi Arabia to fight Saddam Hussein.³¹

The Experience of the 3/87th at Fort Carson

The 3/87th was mobilized at its home station, Fort Carson, Colorado, on 17 January 1991 and moved by air to Frankfurt, Germany, on 5 February 1991. The 20 days spent by the battalion at Fort Carson were filled with processing, training, and controversy.

Organization for Mobilization Processing

Fort Carson was a major mobilization station during Operation DESERT STORM and from September 1990 until late January 1991 processed about 30 Guard and Reserve units and numerous individuals for deployment to the Persian Gulf. The 3/87th was one of the largest single units processed at Fort Carson, although some hospitals had more people. It was also one of the last units processed through Fort Carson.

The Garrison Commander at Fort Carson, Colonel Theodore R. Severn, was responsible for processing, training, and supporting Reserve and Guard units and personnel called up for DESERT STORM. In accordance with its mobilization and deployment plan, the Garrison organized three provisional mobilization battalions to carry out its mobilization station mission under a Contingency Command and Control Headquarters (C3HQ). The 1st Mobilization Battalion (formed from the Directorate of Reserve Component Support) processed units; the 2nd Mobilization Battalion (from the AG/G1 Sections) processed individual reservists; and the 3rd Mobilization Battalion (from HHC, US Army Garrison) took care of non-deployable soldiers.³² The 1st Mobilization Battalion was responsible for supporting the 3/87th with supplies, facilities, equipment, and administrative assistance during its processing at Fort Carson.

Readiness Group Denver, commanded by Colonel James E. Record, was responsible to assist the 3/87th in its training and preparation for movement overseas. Readiness Group

Denver consisted of 22 officers, 50 enlisted personnel, and nine civilian employees, whose mission was to provide training and readiness assistance to Army Reserve and National Guard units in North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado. Colonel Record was a field artillery officer who joined Readiness Group Denver in July 1989 after graduating from the U.S. Army War College.³³ He was promoted to colonel and assumed command of the Readiness Group in June 1990.

Although Readiness Group Denver was responsible for peacetime training assistance to the 3/87th, relations between the two organizations were strained. According to the battalion personnel, Lieutenant Colonel O'Neil had a difficult time dealing with Colonel Record and was not inclined to request a lot of assistance from the Readiness Group. Readiness Group Denver had advised two of the companies (but not all of the battalion) on their mobilization training needs during the pre-mobilization phase. The assessment from these visits and the results of 65 other assistance trips to companies of the 3/87th over the previous 12 months were incorporated into the estimate of the battalion's post-mobilization training needs.³⁴

Colonel Record was Chief, Mobilization Assistance Team (MAT), and in that role reported indirectly to HQ, Sixth US Army, while working directly with Colonel Severn. The MAT Chief had primary responsibility for evaluating and providing training assistance to all Guard and Reserve units (including the 3/87th). The duties of the MAT were to review the battalion's condition upon activation, set up a training program to remedy defects, monitor progress through the training, and recommend to the Garrison Commander when the battalion was ready to deploy.

The basic management event used at Fort Carson to monitor the progress and problems of mobilizing units was the Training and Readiness Meeting (TRRM) held at 1600 hours daily. The TRRM was chaired by Colonel Severn and attended by Colonel Record, LTC Steel, other members of the Fort Carson team--and the commanders of the mobilizing units. At the TRRM the training progress and validation status of each unit was discussed, and the ability of the unit to meet the arrival date specified by the theater commander was considered. About three days prior to the scheduled deployment date for a unit, the unit was validated for deployment, and transportation was arranged for movement to the appropriate theater. The validation process called for an initial evaluation of each mobilizing unit, establishing a schedule for remedial or refresher training and providing the necessary personnel and materiel support to qualify the unit for validation and deployment.

The Battalion Mission

The destination and physical security mission of the 3/87th was decided well in advance of the mobilization, but there appeared to be some confusion at Fort Carson about what equipment the unit should take with it and exactly what mission the battalion would have to be

validated to perform.

Units mobilized for deployment to Europe were notified of their theater missions differently from those intended for Southwest Asia. Three Department of the Army and FORSCOM messages were sent to Sixth Army alerting, warning, and finally calling up the 3/87th Infantry to active duty effective 17 January 1991 with a reporting date of 20 January 1991 at the designated mobilization station of Fort Carson. None of these messages, however, said where the unit was to be deployed or what it would be doing.³⁵ Units being deployed to Southwest Asia were informed of their alignment with higher level headquarters by a FORSCOM message amplifying the DA mobilization order, but units deploying to Europe were informed by a separate message from U.S. Army Europe--USAREUR.

Army authorities did know the mission of the 3/87th and its equipment needs before the unit was mobilized. USAREUR sent a message stating the mission and equipment requirements for the 3/87th to FORSCOM on 8 January 1991--a week before the unit was mobilized. Colonel Record was notified by HQs Sixth Army about the location and mission of the 3/87th a week before the unit was mobilized.³⁶ The 96th ARCOM found out about the destination and mission of the 3/87th about 14 January 1991 and notified the Commander of the 3/87th of this fact.³⁷ At the first battalion staff briefing after being mobilized on 17 January 1991, LTC O'Neil said that the Battalion would be going on a mission in Europe--probably Germany.³⁸

Additional information on the unit mission was available right after mobilization. Captain John Simmons, Assistant S-3 of the 709th MP Battalion arrived at Fort Carson on 25 January 1991 to give the battalion information on their mission and the conditions they would find in Germany--particularly on the expectations and method of operation of the 18th MP Brigade to which the battalion would be assigned. Two more messages providing additional information on the mission to be performed were sent on 28 and 29 January 1991. One point was clear. V Corps wanted the battalion to bring along only personal weapons and clothing that could be carried by the individual soldiers on the aircraft. There was no need for heavy crew-served weapons for the physical security mission, and vehicles and communications equipment would be provided from stocks in Germany.

However, even with all this information in the hands of the ARCOM, the MAT, Fort Carson, and the 3/87th, there was confusion about the mission. According to Colonel Record, "Both the MAT Chief and the Mobilization Station commander were working with Sixth Army and FORSCOM to determine exactly where the unit was going, what their mission was going to be and what equipment was going to be required to perform that mission. The answers to those questions changed several times during the course of their stay at Fort Carson. The answers to those questions also determined how the MAT Chief and the Mobilization Station commander would validate the unit as mission-capable."³⁹ In response to the initial inquiry from Sixth Army on how long it would take to validate the battalion for its mission, Colonel

Record said that it would take 90 days to validate the 3/87th at the battalion level, 60 days at the company level, and two weeks at the squad level.⁴⁰

Fort Carson and MAT personnel were reluctant to accept the word from the gaining command about the unit's mission. The 18th MP Brigade Liaison Officer, Captain Simmons, sat in on the daily TRRMs and described the circumstances in Germany, the 18th MP Brigade, and the forthcoming mission of the battalion.⁴¹ However, this information direct from the 18th MP Brigade had little impact on the mobilization processors at Fort Carson because Captain Simmons was outside of the "correct" channels. As the Fort Carson people put it: "The unit had communications with the gaining overseas command before departure from Fort Carson. However, no clear mission guidance was provided, just general type of information was discussed. The overseas gaining command, no matter how good their intentions, had no command responsibility for the unit at that point, and any mission guidance should have come from FORSCOM through Fort Carson."⁴² For their part, the 18th MP Brigade staff was frustrated by their inability to influence what was happening at Fort Carson and by the lack of definite information on the condition and state of training of the battalion and what equipment they would bring to Germany.⁴³

One consequence of the uncertainty about the physical security mission was a delay in deployment of the battalion. V Corps wanted the unit soon so that the Active Component infantry battalion performing the mission could be relieved. According to Colonel Record, there was time urgency about getting the battalion to Germany, and the original time allowed for processing the battalion at Fort Carson was only three days, but he said this could not be done.⁴⁴ Some members of the battalion recall that the 3/87th was supposed to deploy to Germany on 23 January 1991--after only six days of processing--but that Colonel Severn, upon recommendation of the MAT Chief, opted for three weeks of post-Mobilization training at Fort Carson.⁴⁵ Colonel Severn does not recall any change to the schedule for the 3/87th and makes the point that the requirements for processing the 3/87th were the same as for any other mobilizing unit.⁴⁶ Confusion about the mission lasted only a few days before the battalion knew for certain that it would be going to perform a security mission in Germany and would be undergoing training at Fort Carson to help prepare itself for that mission.

Processing and Training at Fort Carson

Activities at Fort Carson for mobilizing RC units included bringing the personnel on active duty, individual and collective training, and--for deploying units--preparation for overseas movement (POM). Of the 20 days spent by the 3/87th at Fort Carson, about five were spent on in-processing, ten on training, two on POM, and three on preparing for deployment.

Administrative processing at Fort Carson applied to all RC units and involved obtaining information and preparing required forms to bring the personnel on active duty, arrange pay and

other support, and qualify the personnel for overseas movement. The process was time-consuming, but it was being performed by personnel who had done the same thing for many earlier units and had established a system. One standard operating procedure was to inform a mobilizing unit not to fill out in advance the required forms, such as the application for Serviceman's Group Life Insurance, but to bring the information only. This was often ignored by the incoming units, who then complained when they had to do the forms over again.

The purpose of the post-mobilization training at Fort Carson for all RC units was to refresh them in their basic skills, orient them to the conditions of the theater to which they were going, and help them get ready to perform their intended missions. The schedule for the 3/87th was worked out by Colonel Severn, Colonel Record, and LTC O'Neil to omit some of the Southwest Asia specific training and add some training on subjects the battalion would need in Germany for a security mission.

The training program was fairly standard.⁴⁷ Instruction on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, subversion, and the threat was standard for all newly mobilized personnel. Guard mount, civil disturbance training, driver training and licensing, and a NATO orientation were oriented toward the unit mission. Training on NBC defense, maintenance, communications, first aid, and other common tasks was designed to improve individual skills. Bayonet training helped instill the fighting spirit in the troops. Physical training was also emphasized, and the entire battalion accomplished the Army Physical Fitness Test.

Three days were spent firing on the range to qualify the members of the unit and the new fillers on their individual weapons. Although the 3/87th had qualified on their individual weapons during November, it was thought necessary to fire again in January because over a hundred new personnel had arrived and others had missed the earlier range firing. Colonel Record makes the point also that the "unit commander(s)" (presumably the company commanders) wanted to "receive as much such training as ranges and ammunition would allow."⁴⁸

Fort Carson tried hard to support the 3/87th properly during its stay at the post. The mobilization plan called for the battalion to be housed in tents, but considering the weather this was not a feasible option, and Fort Carson found better housing in substandard barracks that were undergoing renovation. A sedan was provided the commander, and a van and busses were provided by Fort Carson to transport personnel around the post to their various processing appointments.⁴⁹ A dining facility was made available to the battalion to be operated by organization mess personnel.

How Others Saw the Battalion

The 3/87th was not highly regarded by most of the other personnel involved in its training and support. Some staff officers in the 96th ARCOM thought that the battalion was not as well prepared for mobilization as other units in the ARCOM. The battalion leadership had not stressed mobilization preparedness beyond getting to the mobilization station, when there was a lot more to it than that.⁵⁰

According to Readiness Group Denver, the 3/87th performed poorly during its mobilization processing and training and experienced many training and operations problems at the Mobilization Station. The main complaint about the 3/87th was that the companies and even platoons tended to operate independently. Units would fail to show-up for appointed training or POM actions--either because battalion failed to notify them of requirements or because the subordinate unit commander determined on his own that he was going to do something else and failed to notify company or battalion headquarters. 3/87th Infantry earned a terrible reputation at Fort Carson during this period--all because they couldn't get anybody to the right place at the right time in the right uniform."⁵¹

Colonel Record states that the "relationship between senior leadership of the battalion and the senior leadership of the Readiness Group was poor. Little if any assistance was ever requested at the battalion command and staff level. However, the relationship between the Readiness Groups Infantry/Special Forces Assistance team and the company and platoon level M-day and full-time soldiers of the battalion, was pretty good. Functional readiness areas such as overall personnel, equipment and training areas were not influenced by Readiness Group help. This was primarily due to the Battalion Commander's intransigence in seeking and then adopting assistance at the battalion level. The Readiness Group had a difficult time 'opening the door' and several attempts to do so in the previous year had been met with indifference. After activation, the unit commander had no choice but to work with the MAT at Fort Carson."⁵²

Colonel Severn agrees generally with Colonel Record's assessment of the battalion. The 3/87th did have difficulty getting its units to the right places at the right times and was not good at paying attention to detail. The battalion had poor internal organization and did not seem to function well. Some of the RC units really had their stuff together and did well, but many had to go through the necessary steps of learning how to operate as units. The separate companies did this faster because they were smaller, and the 3/87th took longer simply because it was bigger and had more sub-units.

How the Battalion Saw Itself

The 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry regarded itself as a really good unit that was treated poorly in the mobilization process.⁵³ Few members of the battalion agree with the outside

opinion that the battalion was in poor condition. While there was dissidence within the battalion and dissatisfaction by some of the officers, they somehow thought that this internal strife was hidden from the outside world. Actually, most of the battalion thought it was in pretty good shape.

The troops were upset by not being sent into combat in Southwest Asia. The word that the battalion would be going instead to Germany led to a great deal of disappointment, particularly among the IRR fillers who had volunteered for combat duty.⁵⁴ The belief that they would eventually end up in combat took on a life of its own despite no factual basis. Many of the infantry soldiers thought they were being sent to Germany for staging so the battalion could be sent quickly to the Southwest Asia Theater when needed for the fighting. Hopes for combat in the Gulf died hard and persisted even after the battalion was performing its security mission in Frankfurt.⁵⁵ There is no evidence, however, that this desire for combat diminished their determination to do their duty in Germany.

One consequence of the longing for a combat mission was the continuing effort by LTC O'Neil and the rest of the battalion to take its full set of weapons and vehicles with them when they deployed. When this attempt failed, the battalion asked to take along at least a few machine guns, mortars, and TOWs so weapons training could continue, but the guidance from FORSCOM was to take no vehicles or crew-served weapons, and the battalion deployed with only its individual weapons, bayonets, and some communications equipment. One machine gun was smuggled across and came in handy for range firing in Germany.⁵⁶

The battalion thought that they should have been allowed to utilize their own leadership to accomplish mobilization tasks, and that the "helpers" too often felt compelled to take charge rather than simply to advise and let the battalion do its job.⁵⁷ There are reports that personnel from the 1st Mobilization Battalion told the battalion leaders "Do it our way or you won't leave Fort Carson."⁵⁸ Battalion personnel also believe that they were being over-supervised and getting conflicting instructions from three different directions--96th ARCOM, Fort Carson, and the Readiness Group. In particular, there was conflicting guidance from the pre-mobilization POM processing conducted by the 96th ARCOM in December and the guidance from Fort Carson just one month later. "Literally hundreds of DD Forms 93 and SGLI had to be completed again by the mobilization station due to incorrect completion by the MUSARC POM team."⁵⁹ Soldiers relate stories of waiting in long lines with completed applications or dental x-rays only to be told that everything would have to be done over again. Their view is that there was a lot of wasted time in the mobilization process.

There was general appreciation by the battalion for the support provided by Fort Carson, particularly with vehicles and supply of items needed for deployment. There were also complaints about the quarters and the requirement for the Battalion Mess Section to feed the troops, while at the same time trying to prepare for movement with the unit. Overall, logistical

support from the 96th ARCOM, Fort Carson, and even the Readiness Group Denver was praised by the battalion.⁶⁰

The CAPSTONE mission to the 193rd Light Infantry Brigade was to perform physical security very much like that for which they were being sent to Europe, and there were enough similarities so that "all of the previous METL training was of benefit."⁶¹ Battalion personnel thought that there was little recognition in the evaluation of the 3/87th state of training by the MAT of the battalion's previous training and exercises with the 193rd Light Infantry Brigade.

The standard for training validation set by the MAT was not clear to the battalion staff. There was concern also about the considerable time and effort expended to have all personnel qualify on their individual weapons when many of them had done this just a month earlier. Apparently this was mandated because the battalion was unable to produce satisfactory documentation on the earlier range firing. While the "soldiers benefitted from the extra marksmanship training," this reduced the time available for emphasis on collective training that the battalion thought it needed more.⁶²

Validation for Combat

One particularly controversial issue was validation of the battalion for a combat mission. The view of the Readiness Group Denver was that "the only way they [the 3/87th] could have been validated for deployment was if they did not have to go into combat."⁶³ The unit was "eventually given the mission of performing low-level security for installations and housing areas in USAREUR and that's what they were validated for. Frankly, they never would have been validated for anything else."⁶⁴ According to the Readiness Group appraisal, the unit could not perform infantry tasks above platoon level--primarily because the battalion leadership had decided to concentrate on squad level training. Also, the battalion had experienced a lot of personnel turbulence among drilling Reservists and full-time personnel in command and staff positions.

This insistence by the Readiness Group that the battalion could not be validated for combat was taken by some members of the unit as an expression of a Regular Army determination not to let RC combat units succeed. Citing the example of the three National Guard round-out brigades, some Reservists found it credible that there would be such a policy. Chaplain Leever relates that he and another 3/87th officer were told by an officer from the Readiness Group Denver that the 3/87th would "never go to Saudi Arabia" because the Army was not going to allow RC combat units to look good.⁶⁵ Allegedly, the members of the Readiness Group were told this by a brigadier general. The importance of this incident is that competent, dedicated Reservists believe that this might have been the Army policy.

The Fort Carson Experience

Many of the battalion's complaints about their experience at Fort Carson can be dismissed as normal griping by soldiers undergoing tedious administrative processing and doing training events they thought they had done already. It is clear, however, that considerable tension existed between Readiness Group Denver and the 3/87th both before and during the mobilization. A neutral observer thought that both of these organizations were wrong, and that LTC O'Neil needed to "calm down" and go along more willingly, while Colonel Record should not have gotten upset.⁶⁶ As Colonel Severn pointed out, the 3/87th was fairly typical of most of the RC units that mobilized through Fort Carson. The major difference, however, was the apparent antagonism between Colonel Record and LTC O'Neil that had consequences well after the battalion had returned to Fort Carson.

It was a happy group that flew to Germany, glad to be finished with a mobilization process at Fort Carson they had found to be a distasteful ordeal. Little did LTC O'Neil and the other members of the 3/87th know that they would be moving from the frying pan into the fire and that their experience in Germany would make Fort Carson look like a Sunday School picnic.

The Experience of the 3/87th in Europe

There was a profound culture clash as a battalion of Reserve infantrymen found themselves operating as part of an Active Army MP Brigade. As the participants recount their experiences, it becomes evident that neither group really understood the other and that initially and for several weeks thereafter there was little real communication between the two groups. It was not so much that the two groups did not trust or like each other--although that was true--but that they could not even comprehend the other. The major clash was between the Active Component and the Reserve Component, and the troops of the 3/87th--not without cause--feel that the MPs were condescending or even contemptuous of them. It is apparent also that the MPs had little appreciation for the Reserves. There was a minor culture clash between the infantry and the military police. The infantrymen of the 3/87th thought--or professed to think--that they were better than MPs. Although this kind of thinking might have contributed to wholesome unit esprit under other circumstances, in this case it contributed to an already bad situation. Finally, the experience of LTC O'Neil and the 3/87th Battalion in Europe was shaped by the leadership style of the Commander of the 18th MP Brigade.

The Advance Party: Housing for the Battalion

Two things had to be done to prepare for the battalion's imminent arrival in Germany: getting housing and working up a training and operations plan. These functions were

accomplished by a small advance party from the battalion.

The Advance Party of the 3/87 arrived in Germany on 29 January 1991.⁶⁷ It consisted of Major Russell P. Roux, the Battalion Executive Officer; Captain John Sterling, Assistant S2 Officer; Captain Robert W. Scott, Assistant S3 Officer; Chief Warrant Officer Wally Purcell, Battalion Maintenance Officer; and Staff Sergeant Cochran, the Battalion Supply Sergeant. Upon arrival, the Advanced Party split up into two teams. Captain Scott and Lieutenant Sterling worked at Brigade Headquarters to firm up the training schedule and operational mission. Major Roux, CWO Purcell, and Sergeant Cochran set out to get the 3/87th bedded down in Germany, and this proved more difficult than anyone could have imagined.

The impression of the Advance Party was that the 18th MP Brigade was unprepared for the arrival of the 3/87th and did not care much about finding good housing. This impression may have been reinforced by the inadequate quarters provided the Advance Party itself.⁶⁸ However, the 18th MP Brigade had in fact made a major effort to obtain housing for the 3/87th in the immediate Frankfurt area, but was unable to do so because there was insufficient housing to accomodate the more than 700 soldiers involved. Finally, the 18th MP Brigade was told by V Corps to locate the battalion in Ray Barracks at Friedberg in the Giessen Military Community.⁶⁹

Command Sergeant Major James R. Armour of the 18th MP Brigade was sent by Colonel Delk to look over the proposed area and work with the people in charge.⁷⁰ CSM Armour found Ray Barracks in reasonably good condition. One area had two large barracks buildings that seemed to be in good condition, but another area with a large U-shaped building was a "real mess" and took a lot of work to get into shape. Ray Barracks met the goal to provide adequate housing for the troops and security for the weapons, and there was also a large sports complex adjacent that could serve as a helipad for the battalion's rapid reaction force mission.⁷¹ However, Ray Barracks was about 18 miles from the Frankfurt area where the battalion would work, so the battalion would be commuters during their stay in Germany.

Even after the approval was obtained to utilize Ray Barracks, gaining possession of the buildings proved to be difficult. The units that had deployed to Southwest Asia had left instructions that their barracks and property were not to be disturbed in their absence. Personal relationships prevailed over official inertia, and the 3/87th was authorized to move into Ray Barracks.

The 3/87th Advanced Party had trouble gaining physical access to the facilities. The two rear detachment NCOs--one for each battalion--were hard to find. Yet, it was necessary for the Advance Party to get into the buildings, inventory the contents, and make things ready for the incoming troops. Finally, in desperation, Captain Gandy and Major Roux broke into the barracks to gain access for the 3/87th. Ironically, this act was reported to the MPs, and considerable explaining had to be done. The 3/87th Advanced Party found the barracks and

other facilities to be in poor condition, with some of the personal gear of the departed soldiers still unpacked. Gradually the gear was packed up and stored, keys were obtained, and the barracks made ready for the 3/87th.

There were still more problems with the facilities. The 3/87th was unable to gain access to the office space, conference rooms, and day rooms of Ray Barracks for the troops. The 3/87 commander and staff had to make do with makeshift offices. Another major problem was in obtaining arms racks for the rifles and pistols of the 3/87th. There were insufficient pistol racks to have one in each company, so all of the pistols had to be stored centrally by the battalion. This was a major inconvenience when pistols had to be turned in and drawn for guard duty. There was also a shortage of office equipment although each supply room had a locked cage in which the departed unit had stored its government-owned computers, typewriters, other office equipment, television sets, and morale, welfare, and recreation items. Unable to gain access to this equipment, the 3/87th had to use the few old items loaned to them by the Giessen Military Community, while the troops were unable to use any of the morale, welfare, and recreation equipment locked away by the departed units. Major Roux likens it to living in Visiting Team Quarters.⁷²

Establishing logistical support arrangements went better, although it was complicated by the fact that the 3/87th's mission was in the Frankfurt Military Community, while its support would come from the Giessen Military Community. However, Sergeant Cochran was able to establish supply accounts for the 3/87th with Giessen, and CWO Purcell was able to set up maintenance support. The 18th MP Brigade staff was generally helpful, and some individuals went out of their way to be helpful in establishing support there for 3/87th. Warrant Officer Hansen of the 18th MP Brigade helped get radios for the 3/87th, and the Central Issue Facility at Gibbs Caserne provided excellent organizational clothing and equipment support. The members of the 3/87th have nothing but praise for the logistical support provided by the 18th MP Brigade and other units during their stay in Germany.

The Airfield Weapons Count

The introduction of the 3/87th to the 18th MP Brigade Commander came immediately after their arrival at Frankfurt airfield. Colonel Delk was on-hand to greet the battalion, and LTC O'Neil reported to him on the ramp. At that point things went wrong. In response to a question about the number of troops and weapons on hand, LTC O'Neil was unable to give a prompt answer and had to ask for the company commanders to give him an oral report on the spot. During the ensuing confusion, one of the company commanders gave an incorrect answer and was corrected. The troops waited for over two hours on the cold and windy airfield while all personnel and weapons were accurately accounted for to standard.

For the Reservists this initial introduction to the Active Army was a real shock. They were not used to having to stand in the cold while weapons were recounted, particularly when in the end no weapons were missing.⁷³ LTC O'Neil says that the problem arose because he did not distinguish in his count between the number of M-16 rifles and the number of M-203s (a combination rifle and grenade launcher)--a distinction that was important.⁷⁴ Other members of the 3/87th who were there admit that the battalion was at fault because they could not come up with the same number twice.⁷⁵

The Active Army people who were there found nothing untoward about the demand for strict accounting for weapons at the airfield. Colonel Delk insisted on assuring that no weapons were left on the aircraft, and this was the right thing to do. The battalion should have been certain of its count, but the evident uncertainty and error in the initial report had to be corrected at that time and place. CSM Armour points out that "without the right kind of discipline it is hard to do the job right."⁷⁶ Other MP officers found nothing wrong or unusual in making sure that everything was correct before the troops were allowed to leave the airfield.⁷⁷

Although the aircraft had arrived about 1630, the troops did not arrive in their housing area in Friedberg until 2200 to 2300 hours, and were not bedded down until about 0200. Colonel Delk was on hand overseeing the moving-in process.⁷⁸

The Training Program

The purpose of the training program set up by the 18th MP Brigade for the 3/87th was to orient them to the European environment and prepare them for their security mission.⁷⁹ Unfortunately, the 18th MP Brigade did not know much about the condition or training status of the 3/87th until the unit actually arrived, and so some of the training repeated what had already been done at Fort Carson. The training program stressed physical training, marksmanship (especially for the IRR personnel), use of force and other aspects of the security mission, as well as infantry training for the rapid reaction force mission.⁸⁰

The training plan for the 3/87th had three main parts: I: Force Protection Training; II: Reaction Force training; III: Unit Training. Parts I and II pertained to the unit security augmentation mission and were prepared by the Brigade without consulting the 3/87th, while Part III was to be designed by the 3/87th on the basis of the battalion's wartime METL.⁸¹

Part I: Force Protection Training consisted of 145 hours of instruction covering four major categories of instruction.

Orientation to Germany provided 20 hours of instruction on information needed by the 3/87th personnel to operate effectively in the local environment. It was taught primarily by personnel on the staff of the Frankfurt Military Community and covered such subjects as

orientation on USAREUR and the Frankfurt Community, training and qualification for driving in USAREUR, Status of Forces Agreement, cold weather orientation, safety in garrison, stress management, and V Corps and 18th MP Brigade policies.

Training on Force Protection subjects occupied 19 hours of the schedule. These classes were taught primarily by the 18th MP Brigade and covered such subjects as threat, USAREUR Security Program, guard procedures, search procedures, recognition of explosive devices, use of military working dogs, weapon and ammunition control, use of force, and crime prevention.

Basic Individual Skills training accounted for 34 hours of instruction, given primarily by unit leaders in NBC, first aid, and communications, and physical fitness--including another diagnostic physical fitness test.

Weapons Training consumed 72 hours--about half of the total training time. Unit leaders supervised by 18th MP Brigade personnel put the battalion through qualification firing for the M16 Rifle, .45 caliber pistol, and M60 machine gun, and all members qualified.

Part II: Reaction Force Training consisted of 48 hours of instruction and practical work, all to be given by unit leaders on such topics as reaction force planning, security augmentation operations, sustainment operations, relief of mission, and planning of airmobile operations. Practical exercises on airmobile and vehicular reaction were included, as was yet another physical fitness test--this time for the record.

Some members of the battalion thought that the 18th MP Brigade failed to appreciate that the battalion was already well trained, that the battalion's mission in Panama involved physical security of the Canal, and that the 3/87th already knew a lot about those kinds of tasks. As one officer said, the battalion "already had a fixed site security mission in Panama and had trained for it. The only difference was the weather."⁸² The approach of the 18th MP Brigade, as perceived by the senior enlisted personnel of the 3/87th was that the battalion "knew nothing" and was an untrained unit that had to start from scratch. There was no pre-test to establish the state of training readiness of the 3/87th upon its arrival, and the schedule was filled with subjects considered too basic by the leadership of the 3/87th.⁸³

One reason for that perception was a three-hour class on Range Safety for officers and NCOs conducted one evening from 1900 to 2200 in an auditorium. The MP instructors went through a detailed checklist of 106 points prepared by the 18th MP Brigade on how to conduct range firing. The officers and NCOs of the 3/87th considered this class to be too basic, and that three hours on the subject was "training to time" while the 3/87th prided themselves on "training to standards." They thought that the MPs "did not understand that an infantry battalion knew about weapons."⁸⁴ The officers and NCOs of the 3/87th considered themselves well

experienced in firing weapons and conducting range firing, not only for pistols, rifles, and machine guns, but also for mortars and anti-tank missiles--weapons that MPs were not even authorized to fire.

Weapons qualification was another sore point with the 3/87th. The unit had fired for qualification in October and November 1990 and again in January 1991 at Fort Carson, but they were told that "qualification in the States does not count" so they fired again in February in Germany. Moreover, the ranges in Germany were shorter, used small targets, and were not nearly as realistic as the ranges at Fort Carson. As infantrymen, the 3/87th troopers considered themselves better than MPs in this area at least.⁸⁵

Airmobile training was scheduled to prepare the battalion for its rapid response mission. Captain Robert S. Scott, the Battalion Assistant S3, prepared a training plan based on the latest Army doctrine and his experience in planning airmobile training and operations while on active duty with the 25th Infantry Division. However, when his plan was presented by the 18th MP Brigade Operations Officer to the Brigade Commander, he would not use it but substituted his own plan. Captain Scott and the other leaders of the 3/87th took this as a sign that the Brigade Commander would not accept their knowledge and experience.⁸⁶

The Warfighters

One training-related action by the 18th MP Brigade that particularly upset the 3/87th was the assignment of "Warfighters" to support the battalion's training. The Warfighters were established as follows:

"The 'Warfighters' are a group of five Captains and five Sergeants First Class or Staff Sergeants of the 18th Military Police Brigade, specially selected for their appearance, physical fitness, leadership, knowledge of training, and professional standards. A team of one officer and one NCO will be satellited with each company to perform duties as host, liaison, advisor, external evaluation, and, for certain key subjects, principal instructor. Among other functions, the "Warfighters" will assist units in preparing unit trainers to present instruction, will serve as external evaluators for all training sessions, will closely monitor safety in all activities, and will submit daily progress reports to the Brigade Headquarters."⁸⁷

The Brigade Commander's guidance went on to say that "training will be managed through the 3/87th chain of command,"⁸⁸ but the officers and NCOs of the 3/87th perceived that the Warfighters were usurping their roles as unit leaders. The tone was set at the first

meeting when the Warfighters were "put in charge" of the 3/87th companies and were instructed to stay with them all day. Perhaps driven by the commander's guidance, the MP officers and NCOs did try to run the infantry units, driving the First Sergeants and NCOs wild by making corrections at formations and giving orders freely.⁸⁹

A training critique was conducted daily by the brigade commander each afternoon. The 3/87th battalion commander, battalion staff, and company commanders and first sergeants would meet in the 18th MP Brigade Headquarters with the commander and the Warfighters. At the meetings, each Warfighter would report on his assigned company's activities in front of the 3/87th officers and NCOs.

The reaction to the Warfighters in the five companies of the 3/87th was varied. Two companies simply gave in and surrendered control to the Warfighters, but the other three companies resisted, and there were numerous arguments between the Warfighters and the unit chains of command.

The 3/87th personnel point out that one problem with the concept of the Warfighters was that many of the Reservists were better qualified and more experienced than the MPs assigned to advise them. In Combat Support Company, Captain Slowey had more years of active duty than his Warfighter advisor. First Sergeant Ricky L. Palmer was an AGR with several years of active duty. It took Captain Slowey and First Sergeant Palmer only a few hours with the Warfighters running around giving orders to their company to arrange for a private meeting and make it clear who was really in charge. First Sergeant Palmer told his counterpart Warfighter: "Me Active Army; you Active Army. Me E-8; you E-7. Stop fooling with me."⁹⁰

Similar conversations occurred in other companies. First Sergeant Baker, an old hand, had a serious talk with his Warfighter, a SFC, that put an end to the "bird dogging." After a few days, the Warfighters became less interested in running the 3/87th companies and reverted to a more helpful stance. The leaders of the 3/87th thought that the Warfighters were capable and believed they "were carrying out the brigade commander's orders."

Part of the problem was rivalry between infantrymen and military police. The soldiers of the 3/87th considered that as infantrymen they were superior to MPs in combat matters even if they were "only Reservists" and complained about an "MP attitude." They thought the 18th MP Brigade Staff "did not understand infantry things."⁹¹ First Sergeant Baker thought that infantry NCOs were trained to use initiative, and thought that he was treated as a "Private E-8" by the MPs.⁹²

On the other hand, Major Fortune, the 18th MP Brigade S3 responsible for the training considers the Warfighters to be "a great idea" to shepherd the companies through the training and help them.⁹³ He and other members of the Brigade Staff insist that the Warfighters were

not "spies." Lieutenant Colonel Ruthven, whose 709th MP Battalion provided the Warfighters, thought that they were needed by the 3/87th, used properly, and helped out.⁹⁴

As admirable as the intent of the Warfighters program may have been, however, it did not work out in practice the way it was intended. After the first two to three days when some of the 3/87th leaders showed that they could do the job, the Warfighters gradually backed off and left the training to the battalion's internal leadership.

The Firing Range

Almost unnoticed by the members of the 3/87th, however, the battalion under the brigade commander's tutelage, was improving, and becoming an effective unit. Some of the more observant officers of the 3/87th appreciated what was happening. They point out that the brigade commander knew nothing about the battalion when it arrived, and he could not have been impressed favorably by the initial meeting at the airport, so he put on the pressure for the unit to improve. As the unit demonstrated that it could perform, more latitude was allowed to the battalion officers.

The turning point was an excellent performance by Company B in operating a rifle range at Wackerheim for the battalion's range firing. Company B ran the range so well that Active Army observers were impressed. Major General Garner visited the range firing conducted by the battalion and was surprised that they did so well, commenting that they were as good or better than the Active Component.⁹⁵ Later on, one of the platoons of Company B, led by Lieutenant Nate Smith, did a good job as an aggressor by penetrating the perimeter of a nuclear weapons storage facility secured by an Active ordnance battalion.⁹⁶ The battalion was getting its act together.

The actual response of the Active Army personnel in Germany to the 3/87th training was genuine delight at how well the Reservists did. General Harding noticed the improvement in the way the battalion operated. Initially, he had supervised the battalion's activities closely, but as he gained confidence in the unit, he turned his attention to other, more pressing matters.⁹⁷ CSM Armour noted that while there was some grumbling at the outset about having to fire again on the range, the battalion did it and did it well. What the Reservists perceived as unnecessary training was perceived by the 18th MP Brigade staff as prudent preparation for their important mission of security for the Frankfurt Area.

Force Protection Operations

After the turmoil at Fort Carson and the first two weeks in Germany, it was somewhat anticlimactic as the battalion settled into its operational mission on 1 March 1991. The mission was as follows:⁹⁸

"Conduct force protection operations in the Frankfurt Area; one company remains at Ray Barracks, conducts unit training, and on order, executes security reaction force mission within USAREUR."

All five companies were involved in the mission. Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided mission support to the entire battalion. The other four companies rotated every five days among guard, security reaction force, and time-off. Two companies were on guard at a time, and the companies on the rapid reaction mission or time-off trained during these periods. The battalion was responsible to secure five areas and switched assignments among the areas every week or so to provide some variety. While on guard duty the troops worked 12 hour shifts on or off for the five day period. They had two to three days off per month.

The 3/87th personnel were well aware of the importance of their mission. The threat briefings provided by the 18th MP Brigade S2 Section during the training period were excellent, and all of the troops were made aware of the threat by continuing updates. The first two weeks of the mission were carried out in a high threat condition, and the entire battalion was kept in readiness with no time off during that period. Thereafter, the threat diminished and the security mission became more routinized.

The essence of the mission was to provide fixed site security for facilities and housing areas by standing guard at fighting positions, patrolling barbed wire and other fences, and controlling access to the secured areas by checking identification and conducting vehicle and individual searches as required.

The 3/87th inherited the fighting positions and barriers erected by the 3/12th but improved them significantly. The 3/12th had operated under their own 8th Infantry Division headquarters while performing the force protection mission. By the time the 3/87th was ready to take over the mission on 1 March 1991, the 3/12th had been on the job for several weeks and was tired of the mission. The 3/87th under the tutelage of the 18th MP Brigade made significant changes in procedures.

A minor problem encountered by the battalion on guard duty was the insistence of the brigade commander that only NCOs in the grades of Staff Sergeant (E-6) or higher could serve as Sergeants of the Guard. This caused a problem because the infantry unit was leaner in NCO grades than MP units and had too few of the senior NCOs to do this easily. The infantry

battalion, however, had large numbers of Sergeants (E-5) and was accustomed to using them as Sergeants of the Guard.⁹⁹

Another mission of the Battalion was to provide a ready reaction force for USAREUR. The requirement was to have a company ready for immediate movement anywhere in Germany, and a platoon prepared to move anywhere in Europe. These units were held on standby in Ray Barracks, ready if necessary to be picked up by helicopters and flown to the location of an incident. The housing area had been selected partially because it had a helipad, and the companies had trained in airmobile operations to prepare themselves for this mission.

The force protection mission of the 3/87th was carried out successfully but not uneventfully. There were numerous instances requiring increased vigilance, but there were no terrorist attacks--perhaps due to the visible presence of the infantry soldiers defending the Army's facilities and families.

As the threat diminished and the redeployment of forces from the Southwest Asia theater back to Germany commenced, the novelty of the experience faded, and it became harder to motivate the soldiers to perform guard duty. Training and recreational tours were instituted to keep the troops busy and happy. Continuing training included additional work on Force Protection, more NBC defense, Land Navigation, Military Operations in Urban Terrain, Patrolling, and Sergeants time for NCOs to use as they saw fit to improve their troops on individual skills. Physical training and weapons maintenance were also scheduled. About 44 hours of continuing training were scheduled per week for the two companies not engaged in guard duty.¹⁰⁰ The Battalion Chaplain, Major Leever, organized trips and visits for the troops to take during their off-duty periods.

Continuing Problems

After the initial shock of meeting their new brigade commander, undergoing the fast and furious training program, and settling into the operational mission, relationships between the 3/87th and the 18th MP Brigade improved--but there were still problems. Some of these problems existed--in the minds of the infantrymen at least--because they thought that the commander was ordering them to do things not required of his own MPs. There were numerous instances of this kind of complaint, involving the way the web belt was fastened, the way that guard duty was performed, the way that ammunition was counted, and even wearing rubber boots while on guard duty. Each of these instances reveals a lack of trust and communication between the battalion and the brigade, but no example shows better just how profound was the misunderstanding than the matter of the rubber boots.

Rubber Boots. The brigade put out an order requiring the troops of the 3/87th to wear rubber boots while standing guard. The purpose of this order was to protect the troops of the

3/87th who were standing guard in static posts in a cold and wet climate, while the MPs were riding around in vehicles on law enforcement patrols. Frost bite was a big problem in Germany, and the rubber boots were intended to provide protection against that. One of the other battalion commanders in the 18th MP Brigade had gotten into a lot of trouble over a few cases of frost bite, and the brigade did not want any frost bite in the 3/87th.¹⁰¹ The soldiers of the 3/87th, however, took it as another sign of picking on them. As infantrymen, they were used to travelling light and thought that rubber boots were not essential for infantry combat.¹⁰² Not grasping the intent of the order, the Reservists complained that they had to wear the rubber boots, while the Active MPs did not.¹⁰³ Upon receiving a request from the 3/87th, the brigade commander changed this policy so that the infantrymen did not have to wear the dreaded rubber boots as the winter weather eased.

Ammunition control. Proper control was essential to assure that ammunition did not fall accidentally into the wrong hands, and the standard Army practice was to count the ammunition, place it in sealed boxes, and check the seals daily to assure the ammunition was still intact. The brigade, however, placed a requirement on the 3/87th that the seals of each box were to be broken daily and each round counted each day. This was not only far more stringent than the Army required, but it caused a great deal of workload and was literally a 24 hour per day job. The S2 Officer, Captain Klein, had to verify all of this, which meant that he spent all of his time breaking seals, counting ammunition, and resealing boxes and could not perform the S2 function. Captain Klein thought that the ammunition counting requirement was poor because it applied only to the 3/87th. He visited MP units and found their ammunition control to be lax.¹⁰⁴

LTC O'Neil would not approach Colonel Delk on the matter, so Major Roux and Captain Klein prepared for an opportunity. It came at a social reception, when in response to a routine "How is it going?" by Colonel Delk, Captain Klein complained about the ammunition counting requirement.¹⁰⁵ Colonel Delk then eased off on the requirement.

The Dining Facility. The brigade commander ordered the 3/87th to assume full responsibility for the Dining Facility in the Friedberg Sub-Community, and to bring it up to his very high standards. The 3/87th replaced an Active Component Support Battalion that had been feeding the troops in the area. The Friedberg Sub-Community was somewhat taken aback by this, but they acquiesced, and the 3/87th inventoried and took over the facility and equipment.¹⁰⁶ At the brigade commander's direction, the 18th MP Brigade food service personnel "sat on" the 3/87th Dining Facility, and this caused problems for the 3/87th. One of the volunteer IRR fillers assigned to the 3/87th was a Master Sergeant with a food service MOS, but who had no experience running a mess hall, admitted it, and was willing to work under the Battalion Mess Sergeant, Sergeant First Class Robert Bruce. This arrangement worked well at Fort Carson, but when the battalion arrived in Germany, the 18th MP Brigade Food Service Warrant Officer took it upon himself to put the IRR Master Sergeant in charge of the mess hall. The 18th MP Brigade food service people started running the mess hall and even forbade the

IRR Master Sergeant from getting help from Sergeant Bruce, who had to resort to clandestine meetings after hours to keep things running properly.¹⁰⁷ The members of the 3/87th cite this as a particularly irritating example of the tendency of the 18th MP Brigade staff to try to run the 3/87th in detail and give orders without reference to the proper chain of command. In this case, the spirit of cooperation among the 3/87th food service personnel overcame the difficulties caused by the 18th MP Brigade, and the food was good.¹⁰⁸

These and other instances suggest that the good intentions of the brigade commander and his staff were not perceived as such by some members of the 3/87th, and that some troops thought that the 18th MP Brigade was picking on them. In each instance, whenever Colonel Delk was presented a good case from people in whom he had confidence, he modified his stance, but without lowering the required standards of performance.

Community Reaction to the 3/87th

The initial reaction by the local community toward the 3/87th was negative. By the time the battalion left almost all members of the Frankfurt community were appreciative of the work of the battalion and sorry to see them go.

At first, the wives of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division resented having the 3/87th occupy the barracks and offices of their husbands who were serving in Southwest Asia. When the battalion first arrived, some of the wives of deployed soldiers screamed at them and harassed them.¹⁰⁹ The 3/87th had moved into areas occupied earlier by two battalions--one infantry, the other tank. This became a highly emotional situation that called for delicate intervention by several different senior individuals. Major General Garner and Colonel Delk paid personal visits to speak to the leaders of the wives and made some headway.¹¹⁰ The initial hostility of the wives of the 1st Brigade gradually gave way to active support by most--but not all--of the dependents, who came to appreciate that the Reservists were serving away from their own homes, just as their own husbands were, in order to make their lives more secure.¹¹¹

Other U.S. dependents and troops in the Frankfurt Community welcomed the 3/87th. The 3/12th had left a bad taste in some people's mouths, and the new security forces were welcomed.¹¹² Many dependents showed their appreciation by bringing food and drink to the troops, and throwing parties for them. The dependents were well aware of the terrorist threat and welcomed the presence of the 3/87th, saying that they liked seeing soldiers marching in formation and that hearing cadence counts was "music to our ears."¹¹³

To show their appreciation for the Reserve units in the 18th MP Brigade, Colonel and Mrs. Delk gave a large party at their quarters attended by the staff officers, company commanders, and first sergeants of all of the brigade units. Plenty of "really good food and drink" was on hand. The members of the 3/87th thought it was a good party and a nice gesture

by Colonel Delk.¹¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, the 3/87th was relieved of its operational mission, turned in the equipment received in Germany, and prepared to go back to Fort Carson.

Demobilization

The battalion arrived back at Fort Carson on 1 May 1991 to be met by their loved ones and celebrate the return to the USA. It had spent 84 days in Germany.

Demobilization processing of the unit at Fort Carson proceeded rapidly but not smoothly, for the troops wanted out and were generally not content to go along with the desire of the authorities at Fort Carson for an orderly process. LTC O'Neil allowed the personnel of the companies located at Denver and Pueblo to go home at night, and this caused problems when they were late returning for processing the next day.

Tensions between the battalion and Readiness Group Denver resurfaced during demobilization processing. Colonel Record objected to LTC O'Neil's decision to let his troops go home at night but was overruled by Colonel Severn and the troops were allowed to leave. LTC O'Neil complained again that the mobilization station was breaking his chain of command, citing an instance in which an IRR soldier was issued a vehicle without going through the battalion, after which the battalion was asked for help in retrieving the vehicle.¹¹⁵

The major source of tension during demobilization, however, was the treatment of the IRR personnel, who complained about being treated poorly. According to Colonel Record, the battalion did not take proper care of them.¹¹⁶ The problem was that the original unit members were allowed to go home at night, and 1st Mobilization Battalion housed the IRR personnel together in an unsatisfactory barracks. Although one purpose for this was to expedite the early processing and release of the IRR personnel, that did not work out very well. There were some problems at the company level in coordinating the demobilization processing for the IRR personnel, and so they were processed at the same time as the original unit members. In the Battalion After Action Report, LTC O'Neil remarked that the IRR personnel should have been processed first to expedite their return to their families.¹¹⁷ The IRR episode during demobilization is perceived to be the primary reason why Colonel Record again sought to have LTC O'Neil relieved of command--eventually succeeding.¹¹⁸ (See Epilogue)

The demobilization processing was completed in a week, and the troops went on terminal leave pending official release from active duty on 15 May 1991, after serving on active duty for 120 days.

What Happened?

What actually happened is that the 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry, came on active duty went through training and processing at Fort Carson, moved to Germany, received additional training, and performed well on an important physical security mission not to their liking. The battalion started out cocky and somewhat disorganized, with internal problems and strong leadership that was not well supported. The experience at Fort Carson shook the confidence of the leadership and strengthened the turmoil inside the battalion. It was a real shock for all to come under the command of a tough demanding brigade commander in Germany. However, despite perceptible weakening of the battalion's leadership, the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel worked together to do the job that had been asked of them. Although unappreciated--even reviled by some members of the battalion--the primary instrument for the improvement and success of the battalion was Colonel Delk. Colonel Delk gave some pain, but in the end there was considerable gain.

The story of the 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry shows that different groups can witness the same events and draw opposite conclusions. Despite being in the same Army, the 3/87th on the one hand and the Active Army personnel at Fort Carson and Germany have different views. The Active Component people at Fort Carson thought the battalion was a disorganized group with an incompetent commander. The Active Component people in Germany thought the battalion improved a lot and performed outstandingly on an important mission. The battalion saw itself as a good outfit that was treated unfairly. Each of these perspectives has some truth.

Many Reservists thought that their experience highlighted serious problems in the AC-RC relationship. One company commander, who thought that Germany was a good experience and that the battalion had done well, also felt that as a Reservist he was never really accepted by the Active Army people.¹¹⁹ Some Reservists thought the Active Component premise--based on stereotypes of long standing--was that Reserve Component units were "incompetent until proven competent," Many Reservists thought also that their own unit's standards were higher than those of the Active Component MP companies, and said that once they had proven themselves, the Active Component people backed off and treated them with respect.¹²⁰

The Active Army leadership in Germany has high praise for the 3/87th. Members of the unit were awarded five Army Commendation Medals and 45 Army Achievement Medals for their service in Germany. The overall view of those who witnessed the battalion's performance in Europe was they improved a great deal and did a good job.

General Garner thought the 3/87th was a good unit, and he was impressed that a Reserve unit could do so well.¹²¹

Colonel Delk says that the battalion had "strong leadership" and was very good. They accepted a totally new and foreign mission with a good attitude.¹²²

CSM Armour thought the battalion did well overall, and he was particularly impressed with Acting CSM Snyder, who showed a lot of dedication by leaving his wife, and nine children, including an ill foster son, and deploying with the battalion.¹²³

Major Fortune says that "the 3/87th caught on in a hurry and did a great job, but that Colonel Delk did not let them know they did."¹²⁴

The official view of the performance of the 3/87th in Europe is stated in the V Corps message announcing that the mission of the battalion was completed and the unit would be returning to its home station:¹²⁵

"3-87th IN Bn has performed its mission in an outstanding manner and served as an excellent representative of the Reserve Components. Their professionalism is commendable, and the soldiers, civilian employees, and family members of the V (U.S.) Corps greatly appreciate their efforts and contributions to security in USAREUR during DESERT STORM. Victory Corps!"

Epilogue

The players in this all too human drama have moved onward, and some upward as well.

Colonel Delk is now the Assistant Commandant of the Military Police School, a key assignment. He was hand-picked for this post precisely because of his ability to get things done and his uncompromising insistence on high standards.¹²⁶

Colonel Record is still the Chief, Readiness Group, Denver and still working with the 3/87th Battalion--but with praise for the new battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel James L. Clement.¹²⁷

Colonel O'Neil is no longer in the Selected Reserve. He left the 3/87th right after demobilization, was promoted to colonel, and was assigned to the 1st Maneuver Training Command. Six months later he was relieved from the 1st MTC, by the Commander 96th ARCOM at--according to O'Neil--the instigation of Colonel Record. His military service is ended.¹²⁸

There has been significant turnover in the battalion. Most of the staff officers and two of the company commanders are no longer in the unit. Captain Bair, the Personnel Officer, has

been promoted to major as the Battalion Operations Officer and the senior full-timer in the unit. Major Roux took over as acting commander until 18 October 1992, when Lieutenant Colonel Clement assumed command. Subsequently, Major Roux was promoted to lieutenant colonel and reassigned to the FEMA Regional Office in Denver.

The 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry has regrouped and is moving ahead. The battalion went to Panama for Annual Training in 1992 and did well there. The new battalion commander is determined to pull the battalion together into a coherent unit and has already created a more disciplined environment in the unit. LTC Clement has moved actively to improve relationships with Colonel Record and the Readiness Group Denver. The troops appear to be happier and more unified than they were, but stories are still told and complaints are still made about Colonel Delk and the MPs by the old-timers, who perhaps do not grasp that the true significance of their experience during Operation DESERT STORM was that they met with flying colors the challenge of soldiering under difficult conditions.

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End-Notes

1. Arthur H. Blair, At War in the Gulf: A Chronology, Texas A&M University Press, 1992.
2. General Crosbie E. Saint, "War Adds New Dimensions to Europe's Role," Army, October 1991.
3. The 1181st, 1182nd, and 1185th Transportation Terminal Units also served in Europe at Antwerp, Bremerhaven, and Rotterdam respectively but for short periods of temporary duty or (for the 1182nd) Annual Training. See monograph entitled, "US Army Reserve Participation in Port Operations for Operation DESERT STORM", Andrulis Research Corporation, 3 May 1991.
4. Interview, Major General James R. Harding, 23 September 1992.
5. Major General Harding, 23 September 1992.
6. Interview, Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Rauer, then Executive Officer, 18th MP Brigade, 7 October 1992.
7. LTC Rauer, 7 October 1992.
8. Based on telephone interviews with LTC Crane, DAAR-OP, on 12 November 1992, Mr Frank P. Weber, then Chief, Mobilization Division, DAMO-ODM, on 20 November 1992, and LTC Ralph Shaw, then Chief, Force Structure Branch, OCAR, on 7 December 1992.
9. The three infantry brigades are the 157th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Pennsylvania) with 2 mechanized and 1 tank battalion; the 187th Infantry Brigade (Massachusetts) with three infantry battalions; and the 205th Light Infantry Brigade (Minnesota) with three light infantry battalions. The 205th Brigade specializes in cold weather operations and has an assignment to round out the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska. The 8th Battalion of the 40th Armor Regiment is in Phoenix, Arizona. Source is Joanne Krol, DAAR-OP-O, 7 October 1992.
10. Mr Nat Crow, Public Affairs Office, 9th ARCOM, 9 November 1992.
11. Historical Summary, "The Third Battalion, 87th Infantry (Light)," Mr Henry G. Cole, 18 October 1992.
12. Major Bair, 11 February 1993.
13. Letter, LTC Dean F. O'Neil, 2 December 1992.
14. Letter, Major Russell P. Roux, 5 January 1993.

15. Major Roux, 18 October 1992.
16. Letter, Major Roux, 5 January 1993.
17. Letter, Major Roux, 5 January 1993.
18. Telephone interview, CPT Bair, 30 Dec 1992. Several staff officers had recommended SFC Palmer for the Command Sergeant Major job, but LTC O'Neil thought that Palmer was too junior and selected 1SG Snyder.
19. Telephone interviews, CPT Bair, 30 December 1992, and LTC James L. Clement, 31 Dec 1992. Sergeant Snyder's foster son died after the battalion had returned to Fort Carson.
20. Major Roux, 18 October 1992.
21. Letter, Chaplain (Major) Richard T. Leever, 15 December 1992.
22. Strength data furnished by Major Boyd Holdaway, HQ 96th ARCOM, 13 November 1992, and other sources in the official reports. These data do not add up, and it has been necessary to interpolate.
23. Letter, Henry S. Cole, 3/87th, 5 November 1992.
24. The battalion itself was not authorized women, but two attached Personnel and Finance Detachments left behind at Fort Carson included several female soldiers, who complained about not being allowed to deploy with the unit.
25. Letter, Chaplain Leever, 15 December 1992.
26. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
27. This paragraph is based on FORSCOM Form 1-R, Analysis of Training Performance of Reserve Components of the Army, 3-87th INF, 17 August 1990.
28. Training Schedule, 3/87th S-3 Section, for 17 & 18 November 1990, and supplemental documentation.
29. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
30. Telephone interview, Major Al Garcia, Jr., HQ 96th ARCOM, 12 November 1992.
31. Captain Herman J. Ledbetter, Daily Journal, entry for 17 January 1991. Then First Lieutenant Ledbetter was Assistant S3 of the battalion during the mobilization and kept a journal

of his observations. In civilian life, Captain Ledbetter is an attorney.

32. John Seitz and Ted Silva, 6 November 1992, and Letter, HQs, Fort Carson, 17 November 1992.

33. Letter, Readiness Group Denver, "Mobilization of 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, USAR," 7 January 1993.

34. Memorandum, Readiness Group, Denver, Subject: "Mobilization of the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, USAR," 16 November 1992.

35. Mr Mike Hamer, Chief of the Mobilization Division, FORSCOM, 29 December 1992. The 3/87th was called up in Increments, and three different messages were involved: a HQDA Alert message; a FORSCOM Warning Order; and a HQDA Mobilization Order.

36. Colonel Record, 7 January 1993.

37. Telephone interview, Major Al Garcia, Jr., 96th ARCOM, 12 November 1992.

38. Ledbetter Journal, op. cit.

39. Memorandum, Readiness Group Denver, 16 November 1992.

40. Colonel Record, 7 January 1993.

41. Colonel Record, 7 January 1993.

42. Letter, HQs, Fort Carson, Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, 17 November 1992.

43. Major Fortune, S3, 18th MP Brigade, 7 January 1993.

44. Colonel Record, 7 January 1993. Colonel Record attributes the urgency for the 3/87th validation to pressure from OCAR.

45. Major Roux, 18 October 1992.

46. Telephone interview, Col Severn, 29 December 1992.

47. Readiness Group Denver, Master Events Calendar for January 1991.

48. Letter, Readiness Group, Denver, op. cit.

49. Letter, Hqs Fort Carson, Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, 17 November 1992.

50. Major Garcia, op. cit., 12 November 1992.
51. Memorandum, Readiness Group, Denver, op. cit.
52. Memorandum, Readiness Group, Denver, op. cit.
53. Telephone Interview, CPT Bair, 29 December 1992.
54. Captain Scott, et. el., 18 October 1992.
55. Ledbetter, op. cit.
56. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
57. HQs, 3rd Battalion, 87th Infantry, Memorandum, Subject: "Revised ODS After-Action Report," 5 October 1992.
58. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
59. Revised After-Action Report, 5 October 1992, op. cit.
60. Revised After-Action Report, 5 October 1992, op. cit.
61. Revised After-Action Report, 5 October 1992, op. cit.
62. Revised After-Action Report, 5 October 1992, op. cit.
63. LTC Kenn A. Roehl, Deputy Chief, Readiness Group Denver, 7 January 1993.
64. Memorandum, Readiness group, Denver, op. cit.
65. Telephone Interview, Chaplain Richard T. Leever, 21 October 1992.
66. Officer assigned to Fort Carson.
67. This account of the Advance Party is based primarily on an interview with Major Russell P. Roux, 18 October 1992.
68. Major Roux, 18 October 1992. Major Roux and the other 4 members of the Advanced Party were billeted in two rooms at V Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt.
69. Interview, LTC Rauer, 11 December 1992.

70. Captain Scott, et. al., thought that CSM Armour was delegated the decision about which facilities would be used for the 3/87th.
71. Telephone interview, CSM James R. Armour, 29 December 1992.
72. Major Roux, 18 October 1992.
73. Letter, Chaplain Leever, December 1992.
74. LTC O'Neil, 20 November 1992.
75. Telephone interview, Captain Richard F. Klein, 7 January 1993.
76. CSM Armour, 29 December 1992. CSM Armour points out that some of the Active Army units returning to Europe from the Southwest Asia Theater were careless in their accounting for weapons and had some lost and stolen as a result of this lack of discipline.
77. Major Fortune and LTC Rauer, 11 December 1992.
78. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
79. LTC Rauer, 11 December 1992.
80. Major Fortune, 11 December 1992.
81. Memorandum, Hqs 18th MP Brigade, "Initial Training Plan for the 3-87 Infantry," 31 January 1991. Part III was never conducted.
82. Captain Scott, et. al.. There is no evidence that the peacetime assignment of the 3/87th to a similar security mission had anything to do with the selection of the Battalion for this security mission.
83. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992. Members of the 3/87th believe that the two Reserve Component Military Police companies assigned to the 18th MP Brigade had serious deficiencies, and that this caused the brigade to expect the same of the 3/87th Infantry.
84. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
85. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
86. Captain Scott, et. al., 18 October 1992.
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